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Title: Re-evaluating the Yom Kippur ‘intelligence failure’: the cultural lens in crisis 
 
 
Abstract:  
Henry Kissinger famously explained the ‘intelligence failure’ of Yom Kippur in cultural terms, 
asserting that Western analysts were unable to understand Arab rationality in ‘starting an unwinnable 
war to restore self-respect.’ This article fundamentally challenges this conventional understanding of 
the 1973 surprise attack. Drawing on recently declassified material and interviews with veteran 
diplomats and intelligence professionals it will show that both the British and American intelligence 
communities had an excellent sense of Egyptian President Sadat’s intentions in waging war against 
Israel. Rather the evidence suggests that misconceptions about Egyptian military capability were more 
important. These misconceptions derived from particular ideas about Arab culture and Soviet-Egyptian 
relations following the expulsion of Soviet advisors in 1972. The article thereby illuminates wider 
questions about how we define ‘failure’ in intelligence and the role of cultural ideas in international 
history.  
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On 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria co-ordinated a lightening surprise attack against Israel. Though 
short-lived, it was a war that would change the face of the modern Middle East. Launched at 2.pm on 
the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, the Sabbath of Yom Kippur, the momentum of the attack carried 
Egyptian armoured units several miles east of the Suez Canal. Within just three days the Egyptian 
military were blocked by Israeli retaliation, yet the initial achievements of the Egyptians marked a 
symbolic turning point in world history. In retrospect the war marked the first step towards a bilateral 
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel that would dramatically alter Egypt's seminal role in the 
international politics of the Middle East. Moreover, it was a conflict with strikingly international 
implications, bringing the world’s superpowers to the brink of a nuclear confrontation in support of 
their respective allies and provoking the first global oil crisis in numerous European capitals. Arab 
states united in an unprecedented manner to impose an oil embargo that would visibly punish the 
United States for backing Israel.  
     The regional and international context to this crisis began in June 1967, when the Israeli Defense 
Force embarked upon a pre-emptive lightning strike against the Arab States. In just six days Israel 
absorbed three times its territory, seizing Sinai and the Suez Canal from Egypt, Jerusalem and the West 
Bank from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria. In the aftermath of war, American diplomatic 
policy evolved to support these territorial acquisitions until the defeated Arab governments were 
prepared to declare peace with Israel. Against this increasingly adversarial relationship between the 
U.S. and Arab States, the British assumed the more neutral role of ‘honest broker’ in the Arab-Israeli 
dispute authoring the ambiguous UN Security Council Resolution 242 which called for Israeli 
withdrawal from occupied territories.   
     From a Cold War perspective, the dramatic military defeat of Egypt forced a greater dependence on 
Soviet arms. It served to consolidate Soviet presence in the Middle East as the US-Israeli relationship 
also deepened and Israel came increasingly to be seen as an ally in the Cold War. In July 1970, this 
culminated in the arrival of 15,000 Soviet advisors in Egypt during the peak of the War of Attrition to 
defend the Egyptian heartland against Israeli deep penetration raids. In July 1972, President Nasser’s 
successor, Anwar al Sadat tried to break the stalemate by getting rid of the Soviet advisors and 
indicating to the Nixon Administration both overtly and covertly, that he would be prepared to reach a 
separate agreement with Israel. 
     The Nixon administration faced a number of domestic and international considerations that stood in 
the way of a more active policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict that might have averted the 1973 War. 
Uppermost in U.S. foreign policy considerations towards the Middle East was Détente. Nixon was 
concerned that disagreements over the Middle East would threaten the progress made in the historic 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Moreover U.S. Presidential elections in 1972 meant that it 
was impossible for any candidate, not least Nixon, to adopt a hard line against Israel. Indeed, in 1973, 
the American administration begin to supply Israel with F-4 Phantom jets and decided that any 
diplomatic initiative must wait for Israel’s elections in October. Domestically, the resignation of Vice 
President Spiro Agnew and the Watergate Crisis plunged the American administration into turmoil and 
effectively left Henry Kissinger at the helm of decision-making towards the Middle East.
1
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      However, the October War and the subsequent escalation of the Crisis, forced the Arab-Israeli 
conflict to the top of the American foreign policy agenda. The war revealed that Israeli reluctance to 
withdraw from occupied Arab territories could have major strategic consequences for the superpower. 
Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were forced into the curious position of militarily resupplying their 
clients during the fighting, whilst simultaneously collaborating on a UN ceasefire proposal to quell the 
conflict. After Israeli contraventions of the ceasefire, the Soviets responded with a sharp warning that if 
Israel proceeded to violate the UN agreement, they would take the ‘appropriate steps unilaterally.’ In 
response, on the 25 October, the U.S. put their nuclear forces on worldwide alert, a step not taken since 
the Cuban Missile Crisis over a decade before and arguably, a drastic and dangerous overreaction. 
Moreover, they did so without consulting with or informing the British government who were already 
frustrated with their American ally’s handing of the crisis.2  
     In Israel, the Yom Kippur war is understandably associated with the word ‘trauma’
3
 How could the most effective intelligence service in the Middle East have failed to predict such a 
devastating attack? Israeli historian Avi Shlaim writes that ‘military history offers few parallels for 
strategic surprise as complete as that achieved by Egypt.’4 In 1974, the Agranat Commission was 
tasked to investigate how such a failure could occur, following which a plethora of studies concluded 
that despite the excellent information available to the Directorate of Military Intelligence (AMAN) 
prior to the war, a range of psychological, organisational and bureaucratic factors (both common to 
cases of surprise attack and specific to the Israeli intelligence community) inhibited high-quality 
strategic warning.
5 
 The historiography that followed offered different schools of thought as to which 
factors were more important. One wave of literature, building on the findings of Agranat, stressed the 
role of individuals, noting for example the manipulation of information by Director of Military 
Intelligence General Zeria
6 
 and the over-reliance on a recently disclosed single source named Ashraf 
Marwan (President Nasser’s son-in law) who was allegedly a double agent actually working for Egypt.7 
An alternative school, composed mainly of Egyptian sources, emphasised the ingenuity of Egypt's 
deception plan whilst also expressing surprise that Israel had failed to understand the significance of 
military preparations in the immediate moments before war.
8
 A less politically motivated literature 
stressed the cognitive challenges common to all surprise attacks and the difficulty of distinguishing 
between ‘signals’ and ‘noise’ in the buildup to war9. The most convincing accounts placed specific 
Israeli failures in the context of wider psychological obstacles to accurate predictions, highlighting the 
role of Israeli strategic beliefs and dogmatic reliance on a strategic ‘Conception’, to which crucial 
information at the tactical level was subordinated.
10. 
As the doyen of intelligence failure, Richard Betts 
has argued, over- reliance on strategic preconceptions that Egypt did not intend to launch war degraded 
the perception of tactical indicators indicating the contrary.
11
 The latest revisionist interpretation has 
gone so far as to suggest that that despite some failures, Israel's intelligence successes in this war 'have 
not been satisfactorily and accurately documented.'
12
   
     And yet despite the international nature and implications of this crisis, there has been little 
consideration of why other interested powers failed to anticipate the war and whether the nature of 
their 'intelligence failure' was similar or different. Both the UK and the US had considerable (though 
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somewhat divergent) policy concerns in the region. On the eve of war, Washington was complacent 
about the Arab-Israeli conflict, prioritising Soviet containment above all else. The Nixon 
administration was overwhelmingly preoccupied with Détente, the war in Vietnam and restoring 
relations with China.
13
 Nixon’s primary strategic concerns towards the Middle East were essentially 
Cold War ones, fundamentally driven by fear that an Arab-Israeli conflict could bring the superpowers 
into open confrontation. Thus Kissinger opted for an approach of diplomatic delay, supporting Nixon’s 
view that Israel was a Cold war ally that was to be armed. Israel was described by Nixon as ‘the only 
state in the Mideast which is pro freedom and an effective opponent to Soviet expansion.’14 During the 
Nixon administration the White House authorized the provision of over a billion dollars in military 
credits to support the sale of military and technological equipment, firmly allying themselves in the 
Israeli camp. In contrast, British policy makers in Whitehall had become acutely aware of their 
dependence on Arab oil and increasingly keen to play the role of ‘honest broker’ in the conflict as they 
bid goodbye to the final vestiges of empire.
15
 Despite their differences, both powers recognised the 
potentially destabilising impact of another Middle-East crisis. Consequently, their intelligence 
communities, exemplifying a uniquely ‘special relationship’, regularly produced assessments for 
policy-makers on the prospects of a further Arab-Israeli war.  
    However, the Anglo-American ‘intelligence failure’ to predict the attack has received little scholarly 
attention.
16
 A leading intelligence historian concludes that the attack on Israel was ‘not foreseen by any 
of the world’s major intelligence services.’17 A recently declassified post-mortem by the CIA found 
that intelligence of an impending attack was ‘plentiful, ominous and often accurate,’ if only they had 
put the pieces together.
18
 A historian from the CIA’s Centre for the Study of Intelligence explains the 
American intelligence failure by drawing on similar schools of thought to the Israeli case study: from 
re-organizational initiatives within the CIA to more cognitive factors such as the  ‘rational actor’ 
fallacy.
19
 This investigation largely confirms the original findings of the Pike Investigation in 1975, 
particularly DCI Colby’s admission that ‘we had a bit of a mindset.’20  
     Moreover, the Nixon administration faced something of an unusual divide between the intelligence 
and policy sphere that manifested in much bureaucratic infighting. Kissinger was a keen consumer of 
raw intelligence and had a notoriously adversarial relationship with the State Department under 
Secretary of State William Rogers, before inheriting his job in August 1973. Kissinger relied heavily 
on much backchannel communication, making him privy to sensitive and important intelligence which 
he did not share. DCI Colby later informed Kissinger that ‘he could have done a better job as DCI had 
the White House not cut him off from certain privileged data.’ This information included earlier 
warnings that Soviet Premier Brezhnev had communicated of the Arabs’ serious intent, a conversation 
between Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and private messages from Sadat.
21
 Even once 
the war had started, infighting between the State Department and Department of Defense prevented the 
Administration from countering a significant Soviet airlift to Egypt and Syria.
22
 
     Amongst the literature has explored this issue from the Anglo-American perspective, the 
charismatic figure of Henry Kissinger has dominated the historiography of this Western ‘intelligence 
failure’. Developing the cognitive school of thought to highlight the role of culture, in his memoirs, 
Kissinger explained that ‘our definition of rationality did not take seriously the notion of starting an un-
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winnable war to restore self-respect.'
23
 This is a claim that as yet has gone unchallenged and 
fundamentally shaped conventional wisdom on one of the most important international crises of the 
twentieth century. Kissinger argues that a cultural dissonance pervaded Western assessments: a classic 
illustration of ‘mirror-imaging’ rather than attempting to enter the psychological paradigm of one’s 
adversary. Moreover first-hand accounts from the Egyptian side corroborate this narrative of a ‘cultural 
divide’: ‘in the Egyptian view, none of the principal [Western] policy-makers…managed to read the 
true Arab picture – that the Arabs would not be dictated to on terms for the future…they would have to 
deploy every means including resort to arms to get back their lands and their rights.’24   
     Yet despite Kissinger's 'culturalist' explanation, there has been no exploration of how ideas about 
‘culture’ really influenced Western assessments of this war. The past decade has seen growing 
scholarly interest in the role of cultural differences and antipathies in defining the West’s relations with 
the Arab world, stoking a heated debate inspired by Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’ 
thesis.
25
 However scholars of intelligence have, for the most part, been loath to embrace the ‘cultural 
turn’ that has taken international history by storm.26 The majority of intelligence literature has 
concerned itself with unashamedly positivistic objectives: to establish causation; to determine 
‘successes’ or ‘failures’; and to learn lessons. Leading scholars of international history have lamented 
the neglect of culture in this burgeoning field and called for ‘a more probing examination of diplomatic 
texts’.27   
    Thankfully a narrow realm of the intelligence literature has come around to the ‘cultural turn.’ In fact 
the ways in which culture can influence perceptions has a small but established genealogy in 
intelligence studies. In 1976 Robert Jervis and Anthony Marc Lewis explored the impact of 
ethnocentrism in international politics and the American intelligence community respectively.
28
 Since 
then a nascent 'cultural  wave' of scholarship has paid closer attention to the diverse ways that ‘culture’ 
intersects with intelligence, exploring for example; the cultural awareness required for a successful 
counterinsurgency, comparing the organisational cultures of the Anglo-American intelligence 
communities or the relationship between strategic cultures and intelligence failure.
29
 Key monographs 
examining Anglo-American intelligence on Japanese and French views of Nazi Germany rightly place 
intelligence history within a broader framework of political and cultural perceptions.
30
 As the doyen of 
international history David Reynolds persuasively argues, ‘in such a text-based area of history as 
diplomatic history, scholars must therefore be extremely sensitive to language.’31  This article thus 
directly responds to Reynolds’ call for a ‘cultural approach to intelligence history and a more probing 
evaluation of archival texts.’32 
     Yet one groundbreaking thinker on ethnocentrism remains almost entirely absent from the 
intelligence literature. Edward Said’s polemical deconstruction of Western ‘Orientalism’ in 1979 has 
been plainly neglected, if not actively ignored, by scholars of intelligence and diplomacy.
33
 Indeed 
Matt Connelly has observed that, ‘post-colonial scholars today catalogue the cultures of empire in 
novels and travel writing, museums and expositions, paintings and postcards – everywhere it seems, 
but the archives and personal papers of European and U.S. policy makers.’34  
     Despite important scholarly advances at the intersection of culture and intelligence, the application 
of critical theory in this ‘missing dimension’ remains missing. Developing the ‘cultural wave’ 
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described above, recent publications by the author have sought to bridge this gap further, exposing 
intelligence perceptions of the ‘Arab national character’ for example.35 Drawing on Edward Said’s 
literary deconstruction of Western discourse, this work has advocated an interdisciplinary analysis that 
reveals both the spoken and the unspoken assumptions of ‘Otherness’ in recently declassified material. 
Applying a methodology that privileges representation over causation, the case will be made that we 
can use political and intelligence documents about this crisis to reveal the innermost thinking of the 
elite producing ‘knowledge’ for policy-makers about the Arab ‘Other’ and how ideas about Arab 
culture may have influenced their analysis of impending war in the lead up to October 1973.  This 
might well be called, ‘the missing dimension’ of the missing dimension. 
     This article constitutes the first empirical context in which this approach is applied. It 
operationalises how ‘culture’ can be used as an analytical tool in better understanding and writing the 
international history of intelligence communities. How and why were Britain and America unable to 
foresee that Egypt was planning an attack on 6 October 1973? What was the discursive ‘habitus’ shared 
by Anglo-American analysts about the Arab world?
36
 The recent declassification of a number of 
Anglo-American diplomatic and intelligence documents, together with interviews on both the British 
and the Egyptian side allow us to verify what aspects of the ‘true Arab picture’ British and American 
analysts were in fact able to read, and what role ideas of ‘Otherness’ and cultural lenses may have 
played.  
     The relationship between intentions and capabilities has long been recognised as the ultimate 
determinant of strategic surprise. In a much cited article on intelligence failure, Avi Shlaim put forth 
the following equation to explain strategic misconceptions: ‘Threat perception may be said to equal 
estimated capacity multiplied by the estimated intent.’ In the case of the 1973 war, he argues that had 
‘intelligence chiefs not been influenced by the current views about Arab intent they might have given 
more weight in their evaluations to the demonstrable increase in Arab capabilities which preceded the 
outbreak of war.’37  
     Shlaim presents a typically ‘Western’ intelligence failure. The inability to discern the intentions of 
their adversaries is by now a common, even predictable, assertion in the literature on Anglo-American 
strategic surprise. The West's technical prowess has reaped more reward in ‘observing actions than 
divining intent,’  i.e. accessing the ‘secrets’ (or capabilities) rather than the ‘mysteries’ (or intentions) 
of conflict.
38
 Sadat himself intimated that this was a cultural phenomena specific to the West. He said: 
‘You Americans always use computers to solve geopolitical equations and they always mislead you.’ 
What you ‘forgot’, he observed pointedly, was to feed ‘psychology’ into the computer.39 The 
implication is therefore that analysts had a good understanding of Egypt’s capabilities, but failed to 
anticipate war because they fundamentally misread Sadat’s intentions.  
     The discussion that follows will suggest that in fact, the reverse is true. Analysts had a remarkably 
good strategic understanding of Sadat’s intentions. Rather, underestimating Egypt’s capability resulted 
in a failure to take these intentions seriously. Returning to Shlaim’s equation, when estimated intent 
was multiplied by estimated capability; it was the latter rather than the former, which was 
misunderstood, which consequently resulted in a reduced threat perception. Moreover, cultural 
preconceptions played a role in this equation, but not quite in the way that Kissinger suggests.  
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     Analysts on both sides of the Atlantic proved remarkably able in penetrating Sadat’s mindset and 
unravelling the ‘mystery’ of his intentions. They accurately identified that a limited military victory 
would suffice to achieve Sadat’s political goal of regaining Egypt’s honour and reclaiming her land, 
they repeatedly warned that in the absence of successful diplomacy Sadat would have no choice but to 
embark on war and they empathised with the domestic and military pressures on him to take action.  
The real weakness therefore lay not in their assessments of the ‘mysteries’ but more unusually in their 
analysis of the ‘secret’ – Egypt’s improved capability.  
     There was a near unanimous agreement within the Anglo-American intelligence community about 
Egypt's military bankruptcy. Undoubtedly their assessments mirrored Israeli complacency in this 
regard. Analysts could be forgiven for asking why they should be worried about Israel if Israel was not 
worried itself?
40
 As the Director for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Ray Cline claimed 
in a meeting just weeks after war broke out, ‘we were brainwashed by the Israelis who brainwashed 
themselves.’41 British intelligence veterans have also intimated that Israeli influence was important in 
this regard.
42 
A General in the British Defence Intelligence Staff, shot down the predictions of a young 
Colonel that the Egyptians would attack, on the basis that the Israelis insisted that their defences on 
the Suez Canal were impregnable.
43
  Israeli estimations undoubtedly influenced their allies, 
encouraging them to downgrade their fears of war.
44
 As the Franco-Palestinian 
scholar Camille Mansour puts it, the Israelis were 'seen as the experts, the 
‘Orientalists’ of the Middle East in the sense defined by Edward Said: they are at once 
knowledgeable about the terrain and imbued with Western civilization. They are the 
ones who can claim to understand Arab mentalities, their political processes, their 
‘irrationality.’
45
  
    Such Orientalism clearly informed assessments of Egyptian capability. Anglo-American assessments 
reveals that two overarching factors contributed to their underestimation of Egypt. Firstly, analysts 
relied on a library of cultural preconceptions about the Arab World (reinforced by the Six-Day War and 
early assessments of Sadat’s leadership) that pervaded military assessments. Secondly, the dramatic 
expulsion of 15,000 Soviet advisors in 1972 appeared to confirm to analysts that without their 
superpower patron, the Egyptians had no real military option.  
     Finally, the article interrogates the utility of binary discourse such as ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in 
ascertaining the historical role of intelligence analyses in this period.   This case study shows that we 
must pay yet greater attention to the role of ‘culture’ in the field of intelligence and international 
history. As the following discussion will show, the intelligence ‘failure’ of 1973 requires considerable 
qualification. 
     Naturally there are a number of evidential limitations to bear in mind. Though there has been much 
material declassified in recent years, certain documents remain inaccessible. For example, many of the 
JIC records for 1973 remain classified and almost no signals intelligence (SIGINT) is available. 
Considering the limitations of the material available and the extent of US/UK intelligence sharing, the 
article takes a collaborative approach to Anglo-American intelligence rather than a comparative one, 
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highlighting divergences between assessments that will undoubtedly be subject to future revision as 
further material is declassified. Michael Goodman’s Official History of the Joint Intelligence 
Committee describes the growing exchange of assessments and increasingly close relations between the 
CIA and JIC that characterised the post-war era, notwithstanding differences in policy.
46
 Similarly,  
John Dumbrell observes that together with nuclear information, the ‘intimate intermeshing of US and 
British intelligence … formed the essence and beating heart of the Cold War “special relationship”.’47 
Moreover, America had no formal diplomatic relations with Egypt following a political rupture 
between the two states after the Six-Day War. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the Americans 
will have relied even more heavily on British diplomatic and intelligence reporting during this period.  
 
 
Mystery No. 1: Limited Military action 
 
Two years before the 1973 war, the British intelligence community made a strikingly accurate 
assessment of the key motivating factors that would determine the next Arab-Israeli conflict. The JIC 
argued that:  
Sadat might calculate that the strengthening of Egypt’s system of air defence with Russian 
backing would enable him at any rate to reopen limited military action…without making it 
certain Egypt would suffer unacceptable casualties and damage through Israeli retaliation. 
Politically he might be influenced by the hope that such action would relieve him of 
criticism, internally and elsewhere in the Arab World. He might also hope that it might 
galvanise the United States into taking action to restore the ceasefire or into bringing 
greater pressure to bear on Israel in relation to the achievement either of an interim 
arrangement or a comprehensive settlement.
48
  
 
     Identifying the sufficiency of a limited initiative was an impressive feat. It is a central precept of 
Western military logic and Augustinian political theory of war that likely success is the primary 
consideration of a responsible leader leading a nation to the battlefield. Shibley Telhami has claimed 
that, ‘one of the most fundamental assumptions by all analysts assessing the prospect of war in 1973, 
supported by accepted theories of war, was that Syria and Egypt did not have the ability to win and 
therefore were unlikely to attack.’49 In a classic example of self-orientalising, Heikal suggests that such 
pragmatism neglected the ‘obstinacy of the Egyptian and Arab character.’50 
     Yet analysts had a number of precedents indicating that military superiority was no precondition to 
waging war. During the War of Attrition fought across the Suez Canal between 1968-1970, the JIC 
warned policy-makers that ‘despite the Arabs’ military inferiority it is by no means certain that this 
factor will remain sufficient to deter the Arab states from contemplating an attack against Israel, which 
could either precipitate an Israeli pre-emptive strike or lead to an Arab attempt to strike first.’51 Rather 
than ‘mirror-imaging’ their rationale onto their Arab subjects, analysts recognised that within this 
cultural milieu absolute military superiority was not going to be decisive.  Instead they assessed the 
likelihood of conflict in the regional context and according to Arab priorities. In particular, analysts 
recognised the relationship between domestic legitimacy and foreign policy and correctly concluded 
that the primary rationale driving the Arab leaders to war would be retrieving the sense of ‘honour’ lost 
in the 1967 defeat. 
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     In the spring of 1973, Sadat gave a dramatic interview to Arnaud De Borchgrave of Newsweek. 
Analysts observed that its ‘general tone’ was that ‘the time has come for a shock. Diplomacy will 
continue before, during and after war.’52 Such a grandiose statement could easily have been dismissed 
as meaningless. Yet diplomatic reporting demonstrated detailed and impressive analyses of Sadat’s 
answers, deducing vital conclusions about the relationship between notions of national honour and the 
corollary prospects for peace and war. The FCO’s attention was particularly drawn to,  
the rather odd implication of his [Sadat’s] answers to the twelfth and thirteenth questions – 
that although direct negotiations are out of the question at a time when effective peace 
reigns that will not be true when battle is resumed. For some inscrutable reason this 
passage was only carried by al Ahram. What I think the president means is that direct 
negotiations with the enemy while the latter is occupying Egypt’s territory and Egypt is 
not even trying to recover it would be tantamount to the unconditional surrender demanded 
of Hitler by the Allies. If so it could be that Egyptian honour would be satisfied by a very 
small and controlled bout of hostilities across the Canal leading almost at once to “direct” 
peace feelers.
53
  
 
     The reference to occupation and its implications is particularly important. A recent scholarly work 
on Arab perspectives of the October War notes that recognition that ‘in spirit the Arab offensive was a 
response to Israeli occupation, has been largely ignored in the dominant October War historiography.’54 
In contrast, this sensitive and detailed analysis underlines the extent to which British diplomats were 
evidently in tune with this key psychological dimension of Sadat’s decision-making, precisely 
anticipating the diplomatic strategising that would follow an attack. Rather than dismissing such open 
sources as mere propaganda, rhetoric or ‘irrationality’, Sadat’s answers were examined and cross-
examined with cultural awareness and empathy, to infer fundamental insights into the political 
pressures Sadat perceived himself to face and the means by which the prevailing desire for ‘honour’ 
might be satisfied. 
     The interview also caught the attention of Harold Saunders, a south-Asia expert from the National 
Security Council (NSC). Saunders concluded from it that Sadat ‘may seriously be considering initiating 
a limited military engagement along the Suez Canal.’ He judged that Sadat, ‘seems to realise that Egypt 
will not achieve its goal of recovering Sinai by military means, but that an end to the ceasefire might 
stimulate powers to press hard for a settlement.’55 
    In May 1973, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) at the State Department reiterated their 
fears of war more strongly. They noted that although Sadat, ‘has no illusions that Egypt can defeat 
Israel militarily, he seems on the verge of concluding that only limited hostilities against Israel stand 
any real chance of breaking the negotiating stalemate by forcing the big powers to intervene with an 
imposed solution.’ They clearly warned that if Sadat was to ‘shed his last doubts about whether 
military action is essential to achieve this American shift, the only remaining decision would relate to 
the timing and scope of his move.’56  
     That a limited military initiative would suffice to achieve Sadat’s goal of provoking a political 
solution was thus amply recognised. Analysts had a number of precedents and public declarations 
indicating that in the Arab cultural context, absolute military superiority was no precondition to 
initiating an attack. Ultimately, the decision to go to war would depend on what international 
diplomacy could (and could not) achieve.   
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Mystery No 2.: International diplomacy  
 
The quality and timeliness of international diplomacy was therefore recognised to be a fundamental 
factor in Sadat’s calculations. Analysts identified that Sadat regarded military moves as a complement 
to diplomacy and accurately assessed that he would only embark on war when diplomacy appeared to 
have failed. Erstwhile Egyptian Presidential Adviser for National Security Hafez Ismail recounted that 
‘Sadat wanted the heat of the battle to be the force behind the political decisions which had to be 
taken.’57  
     The British intelligence community demonstrated considerable foresight about the consequences of 
diplomatic failure. As early as 1969 the JIC warned, mincing no words, that: ‘in the absence of a 
negotiated settlement meeting the principal Arab political aims, no Arab leader is strong enough to 
abjure publicly an ultimate resort to force, as a means of exacting forcibly what Israel is not prepared to 
yield politically.’58 Looking back in 1974, British Ambassador to Egypt, Phillip Adams reflected that 
although ‘military factors determined the date and time of the attack, international political 
developments over the previous year had reinforced Sadat’s commitment to the war option.’59 U.S. 
policy on the Middle East failed to evolve following President Nixon’s re-election. Fresh supplies of 
Phantoms for Israel commenced even after the Egyptian National Security Advisor Hafez Ismail visited 
Washington in February 1973. Little attention was paid to the Middle East at the Nixon/Brezhnev 
summit in June and the U.S. vetoed a U.N. Security Council Resolution on the Middle East in July 
calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories.   
     The Americans took a more relaxed view. In March 1973, the CIA’s Middle East analysts claimed 
that, ‘despite the gloomy prognosis being assiduously disseminated from Cairo, Sadat has not 
exhausted his diplomatic options.’60 The State Department’s INR was ‘inclined to state the case on the 
risk of hostilities with a political purpose with a little more urgency. If the UN debate of next year 
produces no convincing movement in the Israeli-Egyptian impasse, our view is that the resumption of 
hostilities will become a better than even lot.’61 Though differing in emphasis, there was an 
understanding on both sides of the Atlantic that in the absence of a feasible diplomatic alternative, 
Sadat would be forced to resort to a dramatic military initiative. 
    British analysts particularly stressed the importance of American action in influencing Sadat’s 
motivations. In March 1973, the British defence attaché in Egypt remarked: ‘If I were asked what 
major operation the Egyptian armed forces were capable of conducting against the Israelis with some 
measure of success I would have to answer none.’ He nonetheless entertained the possibility that if by 
‘political necessity or by pressure on the leadership Egypt was forced to take military action her least 
damaging solution and one which might place her in a position for international negotiation would be 
to cross the Canal to a limited depth of about 12 kilometres.’ The attaché recognised that the end goal 
was ultimately political and pointed towards America. He reported that ‘from this position she [Egypt] 
would hope to provoke political intervention by the Big Powers and presumably to negotiate from a 
fresh set of circumstances.’62 It was a remarkably astute analysis, clearly identifying the strategic 
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priority of international negotiations in any military assault. The attaché accurately gauged not merely 
what was likely to happen but the more important issues of why and how, combining military 
strategising with cultural sensitivity in order to enter Sadat’s mindset.  
     This heightened acuity on the British side both to Egypt’s plight, and the potential implications of 
international diplomacy engaged policy-makers at the highest level. On 15 June 1973, British Prime 
Minister Edward Heath made a personal appeal to President Nixon before impending American-Soviet 
talks: 
I do not think it is overstating it to say that, unless Israel can be persuaded to show a 
greater willingness to withdraw from the territories she occupied in 1967, vital Western 
interests will soon be at risk. In the circumstances I very much hope, Mr President, that 
you will give the most serious consideration to using the unique influence of the United 
States with the Israelis to persuade them that they must change their lines – in their 
ultimate interest as well as ours.
63
  
 
     It seems clear therefore that analysts communicated the primacy of diplomatic negotiations in 
Sadat’s strategic considerations. They recognised that whilst Sadat hoped that the threat of war could 
act as sufficient leverage in such negotiations, he was increasingly subject to domestic and military 
pressures to take military action. 
      
 
Mystery No. 3. Domestic Pressures 
 
Analysts identified Sadat’s fragile domestic position as the final pressure point. It was no secret that 
Sadat struggled to assert his authority as a statesmanlike successor to Nasser.
64
 The CIA initially 
believed that he was ‘a compromise candidate chosen for his weakness’ and that he was unlikely to ‘fill 
the presidency for more than an interim period.’65 In 1971, Sadat faced an internal power struggle with 
his Nasserist opponents, exposing a plot to overthrow the new President.  
     More worryingly, Sadat’s much-lauded ‘year of decision’ had resulted in naught. On 12 October 
1972, an army officer led troops into a mosque in central Cairo and called publicly for war with Israel. 
This open challenge to Sadat reflected deeper unrest within the military, relayed in a number of 
Egyptian accounts.
66
 By late 1972 analysts reported, that ‘more and more Egyptians are speculating 
openly about how long Sadat can last and who will take over from him.’67 As British Ambassador 
Phillip Adams reflected,  
The continued loyalty of the armed forces remains crucial for President Sadat’s survival 
and, if he can see no other way of warding off a coup by younger officers against him he 
could well decide to hot things up by ordering some limited military action even though he 
knows that the Egyptians would suffer heavily: better for him a devastating Israeli reprisal 
than the loss of his position. A cynical view of President Sadat’s motives perhaps, but I 
fear a realistic one.
68
  
 
     This ‘cynical view’ has since been validated by several first-hand Egyptian elites affiliated with 
Nasser who claim that Sadat’s focal motivation in going to war was indeed to retain his flailing 
position.
69
   
12 
 
     Military dissatisfaction with Sadat’s leadership reflected broader societal concerns. The period 
preceding the war saw an unprecedented degree of public protest. Student demonstrations, sectarian 
unrest with the Christian Coptic community and innumerable lamentations by the political elite 
culminated in a petition presented to Sadat in 1972. Diplomats reported the contents of the petition 
back to Whitehall, describing 'the calamities which surround Egypt' that 'threaten not only the land but 
her civilisation and inheritance, her ideology and values... her enemies seek her complete destruction.
70 
This all-encompassing, prevailing sense of desperation within the Egyptian body politic led 
Ambassador Beaumont to describe ‘a general feeling of growing impotence and of disintegration of 
President Sadat’s regime.’ Evoking an interesting if Eurocentric historical analogy, Beaumont noted 
that a French colleague compared it ‘to the atmosphere which reigned in Paris at the demise of the 
fourth republic.’71   
     Though less concerned, American analysts also reported Egyptian assertions that the no-war, no 
peace situation was 'more dangerous for the future of Egypt than war itself.’ They judged that such 
statements were most likely a ‘pressure tactic’ to evoke a response from the U.S., but concluded that, 
‘it probably accurately reflects Sadat’s feeling that the present situation is both an affront to his 
personal self-respect and ruinous of national morals, dignity and constructive purpose.’72 Despite a 
deteriorating economic situation, American analysts expressed ‘doubt’ that Sadat was ‘under 
significant domestic pressure to go to war.’ They argued that ‘Sadat and his advisers are aware that 
their military prospects are poor at best.’ The danger was that ‘disaster might well sweep away Sadat’s 
regime than rescue him from his dilemma.’73  
     Analysts recognised that Sadat faced unparalleled pressures to wage war. As a weak successor to 
Nasser, he was seen as particularly vulnerable to pressures from the military and unprecedented public 
protests. Though they assessed that a military disaster might portend the end of the regime, they 
accurately gauged the all-encompassing and detrimental impact of the no-war, no-peace situation on 
Sadat’s calculations.   
 
 
 
The ‘Secret’: Underestimating Egyptian capabilities 
 
If British and American analysts were able to gauge Sadat’s intentions with a relatively high degree of 
accuracy, the same cannot be said for their assessments of Egypt’s capabilities. As Kissinger put it, ‘I 
have never seen a military estimate by anybody, prior to the war which indicated that the Arabs had 
any chance whatever of defeating the Israelis or of even staving off their own defeat for anything 
longer than six days.’74 It is revealing that no NIEs (National Intelligence Estimates) or SNIEs (Special 
National Intelligence Estimates) on the prospects of war between Egypt and Israel were requested or 
undertaken between May and the end of September, reflecting 'the fairly relaxed view US intelligence 
had of the developing crisis.’75 Similarly in March 1973, British military attachés spoke in no uncertain 
terms of ‘the bankruptcy of the Egyptian military capability.’76 The Anglo-American intelligence 
community echoed an Egyptian statement by the Director of General Intelligence Service (GIS), 
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Ahmed Ismail that, ‘Egypt was not ready for war…any attack mounted or led by Egypt under present 
conditions might lead to disaster.’77 It is notable that during Ismail’s yearlong stint as GIS director he 
ran a back channel with the CIA before being appointed War Minister in October 1972.
78
   
     Yet there were some signs indicating an improvement in capability. British Air Attaché Barnicoat 
recorded his assessment of a clash between Egyptian and Israeli aircraft in 1972:  
The fact that these pilots closed with the enemy when out-numbered showed courage and a 
press on spirit even if it was suicidal. This type of determination in the face of the enemy 
has not been noticeable in the past. If this is any guide to the morale of other MIG 21 
planes it could be an important change.
79
 
 
     The JIC also reported some improvements. Whilst acknowledging that the ‘relative standards’ of 
training, morale and equipment between Arab and Israeli military forces differed significantly, the 
Committee nonetheless noted, ‘steps taken to weed out unreliable elements' in the army and recognised 
‘the impact of Soviet equipment and training.’ However, the JIC definitively concluded that ‘Arab 
officer cadres will not succeed in the period under review in matching the highly dedicated and 
professional Israeli commanders in morale or ability’ and that this would ‘remain the over-riding factor 
to be set against Arab numerical superiority.’80 The sheer surety of the statement, with none of the 
hedging ‘mays’ or ‘mights’ for which JIC assessments are typically criticised, demonstrates the extent 
to which analysts were convinced that Egypt could never achieve anything resembling a military 
victory against Israel. Why were analysts so sure? 
     The recently declassified record suggests two overarching factors which influenced and distorted 
perceptions of Egypt’s capabilities: the first was the precedent of 1967 and several cultural conceptions 
it contributed to forming and reinforcing. The second was the shift in the Soviet-Egyptian relationship, 
which not only lowered the guard of Anglo-American intelligence services but masked regional 
dynamics in a deceptively simplistic Cold War framework.  
 
 
Arab political culture and the precedent of 1967 
 
There was an undeniable ‘Orientalism’ to analytic assessments of Arab military capability. Former 
head of the JIC, Sir Patrick Wright recalled in an interview with the author that the two fundamental 
misconceptions the West held about the Egyptians was that they were ‘bad fighters’ and ‘irrational.’81 
CIA analysts published a handbook in 1971 asserting that the Arab fighting man ‘lacks the necessary 
physical and cultural qualities for performing effective military services.’82 Former NSC staffer Robert 
Morris reflected that, 'the worst common flaw in the reading of the intelligence was an abiding cultural, 
perhaps racial, contempt in Washington and Jerusalem for the political posturing and fighting skills of 
the Arabs.'
83
 Even once the war had started analysts wrote that, ‘Egyptian forces face imminent and 
perhaps catastrophic defeat and that the ability of the Egyptian state to survive the defeat (and further 
Israeli military actions) is questionable.’84 How did such absolutist beliefs take hold as ‘common sense’ 
within the psyche of the Anglo-American intelligence community? 
     Past experience was the first clue. There was a tendency to believe that a future Arab-Israeli war 
would resemble its 1967 forerunner – confused and unplanned. This also derived partly from a 
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reluctance to see Sadat as a strategic, political leader in his own right. In January 1973, Ambassador 
Beaumont reflected in his valedictory despatch that Sadat ‘has not the same vision and does not inspire 
the same trust’ as his predecessor.85 Despite these negative comparisons with Nasser, assessments 
nevertheless tended to mirror assumptions of the 1967 war. Kissinger would later recall, ‘not knowing 
Sadat, I had to conclude that he was still playing Nasser’s game.’86 Anthony Parsons, Assistant 
Undersecretary for the Middle East, thought:  
The danger is that, in seeking to restore his [Sadat’s] credibility, he will not only convince 
himself that he must do something but will also create a momentum which he will be 
unable to check. He also seems to suffer from the dangerous delusion that, if he reopened 
hostilities on the Canal, he could keep them within acceptable limits pending some action 
by the Great Powers to bring about cease-fire and diplomatic progress toward a settlement.  
There is also the danger…that he will repeat the 1967 performance, i.e. he will provoke 
the Israelis into some form of pre-emptive strike.
87
 
  
     That Nasser’s actions in 1967 had unleashed a Frankenstinian monster born of miscalculation and a 
dogmatic commitment to ‘face’ loomed large in the minds of analysts, many of whom were probably 
the same people in the same posts.
88
 They feared that like his predecessor, Sadat was foolishly backing 
himself into a corner, which would once more put the onus of unrestrained action on Israel.  
     Implicit in assessments of Sadat’s personal and strategic inadequacies was a belief that Arab 
political culture was not inclined to objectively self-analyse and learn from past mistakes. In a 
controversial analysis of the ‘Arab national character’ almost a decade earlier, the CIA reflected that 
there was,, 
little evidence that Greek analytical self-critical philosophy ever entered the Near East. 
The motto ‘Know Thyself’ is not quoted by the Arabs…The concept of self-examination, 
whether for purposes of self-management or self-improvement, could not be accepted 
because of its conflict with the more honoured cultural requirement of blameless dignity.
89
  
 
This apparently ‘cultural’ characteristic had practical security implications. The JIC observed that, 
‘so far as we are aware the Arab countries get virtually no hard intelligence on Israeli tactical moves or 
intentions.’ They added that 'Arab contingency planning... has been unrealistic and probably based on 
misleading information. This heightens the risk of miscalculation and precipitate action by the 
Arabs.’90 American analysts reported one prominent Egyptian complaining in the aftermath of the 1967 
defeat that, ‘our intelligence service is the most ignorant in the world. Whereas the Israelis knew the 
name of every Egyptian on relief, and his wife’s name too, we didn’t even know where Moshe Dayan’s 
house was’!91 
     Yet as Kissinger commented during the course of war, the defeated Arab states had clearly learned 
more from the 1967 debacle than anyone had anticipated and this was the crucial determinant of their 
short-lived military success.
92
 Prior to war, however, the notion that Arab political and military leaders 
might actually have undergone a process of self-examination with the aim of identifying and improving 
their weaknesses was ill-considered. In an interview with the author, Nasser’s Secretary General, Abdel 
Maguid Farid stressed that the last years of Nasser’s life were dedicated to rectifying the military 
mistakes that had culminated in the ‘naksah’ (setback) of 1967.93 A British intelligence analyst many 
years later agreed, confirming that ‘Nasser made a thorough examination of their failure in 1967 and 
ensured that Egyptian officers were trained accordingly.’94 
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     The theology of Islam was regarded as an important contributor to the absence of a self-critical 
culture in the Arab world. CIA analysts had observed that ‘by definition and by profession, Islam is the 
surrendering of the self to the will of Allah’ encouraging the belief that  'all human actions and their 
consequences are but the sequels of God’s doing.’95 Consequently, there was an inherent passivity 
associated with the Islamic faith and Arab culture. During the War of Attrition, U.S. diplomat Donald 
Bergus described the ‘classic Egyptian stance of standing pat, talking big, punishing the enemy as 
much as he possibly can and taking counterblows stoically.’ The Egyptians hoped, according to 
Bergus, that ‘perhaps an unidentified “something” will occur “somewhere” to create a situation 
favourable to Egypt. It is in the hands of Allah who must, in the fullness of time, reward his devoted 
servants.’96 Ambassador Beaumont alluded to similar themes of passivity, describing Islam as  'their 
lesson and their encouragement in their approach to the Arab Israel problem. For they recall, in 
particular, the extrusion from outré-mer of the Crusaders of the Western World, after 200 years of 
colonisation and they see in this the hope that Israel too will fade away or be absorbed. It is a reason for 
hope and also a reason for not trying too hard.'
97
   
     The British Naval Attaché reinforced, that the ‘Muslim belief in Allah’s Providence and Will’ and 
an ‘innate fatalism’ enabled the Egyptian people ‘to survive a prolonged no-fighting war, but was not 
particularly conducive to sustained competence under pressure.’98   Recent research has shown that the 
British intelligence community was in the habit of emphasising the passivity of other races, but in the 
Egyptian case Islam seems to have occupied a particular pride of place as a factor inhibiting a 
competent military performance and strategic capability.
99
   
     The manner in which the underlying religiosity of the Egyptian people could be mobilised to fight a 
losing battle was evidently misunderstood. If indeed ‘Islam’ affected the Egyptian response to war, it 
evoked a widespread readiness to sacrifice life in such a way that was barely comprehensible to the 
secular political culture of the West. Diplomats were informed that, ‘most Egyptians were farmers and 
even if their sons joined the army they still regarded a decision of war and peace as being of little 
concern to them since whether their sons or relatives died was a matter entirely preordained by God.’ 
All levels of society in Egypt shared a ‘basic hatred of Israel.’ This was ‘not merely a national but a 
religious phenomenon. War would therefore be popular.’100 The notion of individual sacrifice for the 
spirit of Egypt alluded to Islamic scriptural metaphors in which the personal defeats of individual men 
were transformed into collective victories. 
     There was something of a cultural schism here. Not only would a Western state rarely enter war in 
the knowledge that they would probably lose on the battlefield but even military victory did not always 
translate into political gain. In Egypt's recent history, however, the experience had been quite different. 
President Nasser had lost on the battlefield in the Suez crisis of 1956 but had reaped enormous political 
gain and even after a spectacular defeat in 1967, managed to retain the support of the Egyptian public 
and other Arab states. This was partly a result of Nasser’s political acumen but was also facilitated by 
growing expressions of religiosity among Egyptians. Donald Bergus, the unofficial American 
representative in Cairo observed signs of a religious resurgence from 1970. He reported that 'since 
Israel started deep penetration raids, we have noted lively sale by street vendors of 
Plastic mottos inscribed “Allah” or “Allah with us.”...Mrs Yael Vered (Israel’s Miles 
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Copeland) will doubtless inform anybody who will listen that this is another sign that 
Egypt is cracking under Israeli pressure. Our conclusion is just the opposite.’ 101 Sadat 
himself was more explicitly pious than his predecessor.
102
 In a speech to the Al Azhar mosque in 1971, 
Sadat reminded his listeners that ‘Man should not fear anything; for that which befalls him is only what 
is destined to happen.’103 The ability of Nasser’s more pious successor to appropriate and mobilise this 
underlying religiosity among Egyptians to translate a military defeat into a political and spiritual 
victory was thus clearly underestimated. 
     The final belief about Arab political culture reinforced by the 1967 war was the notion that the 
rhetoric espoused by Arab political leaders bore little relation to their actual capabilities. In January 
1973, the British Naval Attaché reflected on the peculiar relationship between word and fact in 
Egyptian politics, suggesting that ‘the present posture is…a timely demonstration that in Egypt there is 
a bizarre relation between word and fact; further that fact is a rare commodity that must usually be 
substituted by deduction and probability.’104 The CIA had long made a similar analytic observation 
about the alleged subjectivity of the Arab mind, noting that that ‘the facts become what the Arab 
emotionally wants to believe is true.’105 The implication was that the words spoken by Arab leaders 
bore little or no relation to military realities. 
     Ideas about the misleading nature of Arab rhetoric were reinforced by, or at least reflected in, the 
work of an anthropologist and Orientalist reviewed by the CIA’s in-house journal.106 In a detailed study 
of ‘the Arab Mind,’ Raphael Patai argued that certain discursive features such as mubalagha 
(exaggeration) and tawkid (over-assertion) were anchored in the richness of Arabic language as well as 
a culture that prioritised ‘face’ or honour over other values. Patai suggested that verbal precision was 
largely a function of literate and industrial society. In contrast the personal independence that 
traditionally characterised the lives of Arabs allowed for greater discursive freedom as a form of 
communication. Patai argued, in long established industrialised society, 
You must be on time for work, you are tied to a machine which will not tolerate 
imprecision, you live in a world of impersonal relations, you must be precise in what you 
do and in what you say. But if you are independent, say, you are a fellah [farmer] who 
works in the field, you come and go when you want, you talk the way you want. Verbal 
exaggeration, expansiveness, imagination, make man more free.
107
  
 
     Moreover, Patai specifically linked the Arab tendency to exaggerate to ‘a cultural phenomenon with 
socio-economic foundations’, effectively serving as verbal compensation for a material deficit. From a 
military point of view this assessment was particularly significant. Patai wrote that ‘the Arabs have a 
proclivity for substituting words for actions…in the Arab mentality words often can and do serve as a 
substitute for acts’ suggesting that this characteristic had a pacifying function. ‘As long as what can be 
called the oral phase of action lasts, there is always the hope that the aroused passions will exhaust 
themselves within words and the swords remain in their hilts.’108 
     That the CIA reviewed this book in its in-house journal, Studies in Intelligence is significant. 
Though the review is dated in 1974, it seems plausible to deduce that 'academic' works such as this will 
have encouraged analysts to dismiss what Arab leaders (and Sadat in particular) had to say as a 
substitute for, rather than an indication of, meaningful action. Moreover, Sadat’s own practices 
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reinforced such beliefs about a dissonance between rhetoric and action in Egyptian politics. He had 
begun making periodic statements about the need to gain lost Arab territories by force, and the 
infamous ‘year of decision’, since 1970. It was not simply the West who believed his war-like rhetoric 
was sheer bluff. Estimates of Egyptian military capabilities were so low and such statements made so 
often without tangible consequences that these warnings were not even taken seriously in Egypt.
109
  
     Indeed, some Arab diplomats were suspiciously forthright about the tenuous link between rhetoric 
and action in any future Arab-Israeli conflict. Just two months before the war, the Jordanian Foreign 
Minister Zaid Rifai explained to British ambassador Balfour Paul that ‘governments in other Arab 
countries maintained two quite separate levels of policy – ‘the Declared and the Real.’ He suggested 
that Sadat and Asad were able to exploit ‘their restored partners’ [Jordan’s] military inability’ to join in 
hostilities towards Israel, ‘as a pretext for calling them off, or deferring them.’110 Such diplomatic 
reporting confirmed the Anglo-American belief in the role of rhetoric as a substitute for action. 
Speaking to a post-Orientalist literature, it also demonstrates all too well the manner in which cultural 
stereotypes can be used or indeed advanced by the ‘Other’ to justify and perhaps even conceal a 
strategic goal. Whether this was a manifestation of ‘native Orientalism’ or strategic deception, it seems 
clear that these diplomatic interactions would have further complicated efforts to distinguish the 
‘signals’ (indications of Egypt’s intentions and capability) from the ‘noise’ of Arab rhetoric.111 
     Analytical conceptions of Arab political culture thus loomed large in estimations of what Egypt 
could achieve militarily. The stunning military defeat of the Six-Day War undoubtedly played a major 
role in this but Anglo-American analysts also underestimated how much had been learned from this 
traumatic historical turning point. Simplistic recourses to Islamic ‘passivity’ misjudged how religiosity 
could be instrumentalised as an active weapon of war among an increasingly frustrated population and 
military. Intersecting through and exacerbating all these cultural preconceptions was the notion that 
Arabs often 'do not mean what they say.’ Anthropological works like Raphael Patai’s and Sadat’s own 
professions only reinforced the perceived gap between rhetoric and action. Indeed, there are even hints 
that Western cultural preconceptions about Arab culture and resultant capability may have been 
cultivated in order to facilitate strategic surprise.  
 
 
The shadow of Soviet-Egyptian relations 
 
In a paradoxical way, notions of Orientalism also informed assessments of Soviet-Egyptian relations 
and the impact the expulsion of Soviet advisors would have on the eve of war. It is peculiar that one of 
the most notable features of CIA and JIC intelligence reporting on Soviet-Egyptian relations during the 
Nasser period was the emphasis on Egyptian agency in the relationship, particularly when Soviet 
influence was strongest in the post 1967 period.
112
 Analysts clearly sought to quell the widespread fears 
of policy-makers that Egypt was merely a Soviet client state.  
     However, with the expulsion of 15,000 Soviet troops in July 1972, left also the caution with which 
analysts had approached Soviet-Egyptian relations. Ultimately the Soviet withdrawal served to confirm 
that in the absence of the superpower, the Arab world could not contemplate a successful military 
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initiative against Israel. Alongside this implicit denial of strategic agency, the expulsion seems to have 
lowered the guard of analysts and particularly military attachés, obscuring the extent of Soviet 
operational influence in the Egyptian deception plan.   
     The ‘relaxing’ effect of the Soviet expulsion on intelligence gathering in Egypt was made explicit 
by the British Military Attaché. He felt that, 
While Soviet weapons systems and their performance in Egypt still constitute a 
worthwhile intelligence target, my Service Attachés’ time is now increasingly devoted to 
the promotion of defence sales...No longer are the Service Attachés regarded as potential 
spies to be hampered in their work as much as possible but as friends, trying to assist 
Egypt in equipping herself for her own defence.
113
  
 
    The psychological impact of more amicable relations between British and Egyptian officers that 
followed the Soviet expulsion meant important residual Soviet influences would be missed.  
     As Bar-Joseph has uncovered, Egypt’s war planners based their plans on Soviet doctrine, stipulating 
that a primary way to conceal real preparations for war is to disguise them as an exercise –
‘maskirova.’ The Egyptians sought to convince the Israelis that the information about military 
preparations they were collecting was connected to 'Tahrir 41,’ a large-scale routine crossing exercise – 
yet another one in a series of similar exercises conducted twice a year since 1968.
114
 The secrecy of 
operations was thereby maintained. Platoon commanders heard that they were to start a real war only 
six hours before the attack. Similar levels of secrecy were maintained in the Syrian army.’115    
     The potential impact of these operational influences was undermined by the physical removal of 
Soviet advisors. After the expulsion, American analysts argued that Sadat ‘seems to have recognised 
that the withdrawal of the Soviet units has weakened Egypt militarily and at least postponed if not 
abolished his military option.’116 Their thinking mirrored heated debates about the move within the 
Egyptian establishment. Chief of Staff, Saad al-Din al-Shazly implored Sadat: ‘You must realise how 
dangerous this decision is…There is no question this will affect our capabilities. The Soviet units play 
such a large role in our defense and electronic warfare.’117  
    In March 1973, the British Defence Attaché concurred, although he included a crucial caveat:  
 Soviet military withdrawal has gravely weakened both Egypt’s ability to defend herself 
and any limited capability the Egyptians may once have had to mount an attack against the 
Israelis across the Suez Canal…My Defence Attaché believes the Egyptian Armed Forces 
are no longer capable of conducting a major military operation across the Canal, except as 
a suicidal gesture designed to provoke intervention by the big Powers and the imposition 
of a Middle East settlement.
118
  
 
     Only in hindsight was it seen that ‘the removal of the restraining hands of the Soviet advisers meant 
that the Egyptians were now masters of their own house, able to lay their own plans according to their 
own ideas.’ 119 Moreover, it was only after the expulsion that rearmament to the scale desired by Sadat, 
really began. Nonetheless, weeks before war analysts assessed (with a discernible tone of smugness) 
that ‘Sadat’s experience with the Soviets appears to have taught him a pragmatism that has enabled him 
to set a course and a pace better suited to Egypt’s capabilities.’120  
    The extent to which the Soviet-Arab dimension blurred assessments is most pertinently illustrated in 
a CIA memorandum prepared on the morning of the attack, confirming that 'as many as 1000 
dependents have left Egypt.'
121
 Two plausible interpretations of the Soviet evacuation were put forth. 
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The first was that the Soviet Union had ‘gotten wind’ of plans to initiate hostilities and in protest were 
evacuating dependents and advisors. Analysts concluded that, ‘in so far as advisors are included in the 
evacuation, the effectiveness of an Arab attack is likely to be somewhat downgraded and the risks of 
Soviet involvement will lessen.’122   
     The second interpretation and the one that, revealingly, was more ‘in favour with the intelligence 
services’ was that the remaining Soviet advisors were ‘being expelled from both Egypt and Syria.’ Into 
this assessment were incorporated considerations of the regional, inter-Arab dimension; specifically, 
that Saudi Arabia’s ‘King Faisal has been pressing hard to convince Sadat and Asad to cut their ties 
with Moscow.’ This was also consistent with the tensions that had characterised Arab-Soviet relations 
since Sadat’s presidency. Interestingly, the NSC staffer suggested that despite their assessment, certain 
actions should be considered in case of hostilities e.g. the evacuation of U.S. citizens, preparations for 
an oil boycott and consultations with moderate Arab leaders. There was in this short memorandum an 
almost intuitive, if implicit, reluctance to dismiss the prospect of war entirely.
123
   
     JIC assessments of the days preceding the war remain unreleased. However, in an interview with the 
author, the head of the Middle East Desk of the Assessments Staff at the time, Colonel John Davies 
recalled his personal (and disregarded) warning that war was certainly coming. By spring 1973, Davies 
had become convinced that Egyptian stockpiles along the Canal portended an attack on Israel. He 
issued a draft assessment accordingly that was torn ‘to shreds’ by Sir David Willison in a JIC meeting, 
based on ‘his supposed expert assessments of Israeli defences.’124 The JIC’s refusal to accept an 
Assessment Staff submission was ‘almost unprecedented,’ Colonel Davies recalled.            
     In September, Davies was alerted to further indicators of war based on communications between the 
Egyptians and Soviets by a contact in GCHQ. By the first few days of October, the increase in signals 
traffic between the two had become ‘so heavy that I became convinced that an attack was imminent.’  
He recalls that ‘the pattern of SIGINT all that week was such as to leave me and…my GCHQ contact 
in little doubt that it was traffic and not deception.’ The evacuation of the Russians confirmed his 
suspicions. Davies issued a Special Assessment, which was passed to the FO duty clerk on Friday 
afternoon. Perhaps recalling Davies’ discredited draft submission in April, the Clerk decided that the 
assessment could wait until Monday. It was not passed to the head of the JIC until war had broken out 
the next day.
125
 An interview with another veteran diplomat suggests that Davies’ was indeed a lone 
voice in the wilderness. Head of the Near East and North Africa Department, James Craig remembers 
that ‘we discussed thoroughly the evacuation of the Russians from Egypt and reached the conclusion 
that we didn’t understand it but Sadat would not attack! I remember ringing the FO [sic] duty manager 
to tell him so.’126 During an invitation to Langley, Davies recalls (with understandable pride) DCI 
Colby’s admission that: ‘I had been the only analyst in the Western world to have forecast the Yom 
Kippur war.’127  
  
 
Conclusion 
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In effect, misjudgements about Arab capabilities, both as a result of rigid conceptualisations of Arab 
culture and the Soviet shadow, meant that although analysts had a good sense of Sadat’s motivations 
and intentions, i.e. the various forces driving his actions, they underestimated his capability to carry 
them out. Even once war had started, DCI Colby thought that Israel must have initiated. 
     In May 1973, Sadat himself accused the American intelligence community of overlooking Arab 
‘psychology’.128 Yet a detailed examination of the archival record shows that the issue was not 
overlooking ‘psychology’ – far from it, the analysis of the central intelligence bodies in both Britain 
and America demonstrated a conceptual and applied understanding of this dimension. They appreciated 
the importance of a limited military victory to regain ‘honour’, the significance of international 
diplomacy and the domestic context upon which Sadat’s decision-making would depend.  
     The declassified record indicates particularly astute assessments of Sadat’s ‘mindset’ by British 
analysts. Britain’s more accentuated policy interests in the region appear to have influenced the rigour 
and sensitivity of their assessments. That the onus of action was on the U.S. rather than the U.K. may 
also provide some explanation – it is always easier to criticise or stress the need for action when the 
obligation to act lies on another party. It is likely that the closer diplomatic relations between Egypt and 
Britain that characterised the post-1967 period (in contrast to the lack of diplomatic relations between 
Egypt and the U.S. until after the Yom Kippur war) enabled more sensitive and comprehensive 
diplomatic reporting on the part of British analysts.  
     Though Sadat’s intentions were broadly well understood, it seems clear that analysts failed to take 
his intentions seriously because they doubted his ability to carry out his goals. In effect the result was 
the same – an erroneously reduced perception of threat. There is a double irony to this underestimation 
of Egypt’s capability. Beliefs about the specificity of Arab political culture were a major contributing 
factor to analytical strengths in reading Sadat’s intentions in 1973, yet similar cultural beliefs 
culminated in a fundamental misreading of Egypt’s military capabilities. The second irony surrounds 
assessments of the Soviet role in the crisis. In the years that Soviet influence was most pronounced in 
Egypt, analysts were uncannily conscious of the need to resist interpreting developments exclusively 
through the prism of the Cold War, rightly stressing the importance of regional dynamics.
129
 After the 
Soviet expulsion however, analysts regressed to a simplistic assessment of Egypt’s capabilities through 
a misleadingly basic Cold War framework: that without the Soviet backing, Egypt stood no chance of 
military success.   
     This dual underestimation of Egypt’s capability by Anglo-American analysts also accentuates the 
psychological primacy of intelligence analysis – particularly the power of stated and unstated 
preconceptions in masking even the ‘facts’ i.e. the ‘secrets’ of a nation’s capability. As one seasoned 
scholar of strategic surprise puts it, ‘avoiding intelligence failures requires the elimination of strategic 
preconceptions,’ but at the same time, as humans, ‘we cannot operate without some preconceptions.’130 
In the case of 1973, this problem was even more acute because the cultural preconceptions with which 
the intelligence community had faced the Arab World in the decade before had been substantiated as 
accurate in, for example, the analytical ‘success’ of 1967.131 Notions like ‘the Arabs do not mean what 
they say’ were validated on many occasions, but October 1973 was an exception. As Kissinger later 
observed, Sadat, ‘paralysed his opponents with their own preconceptions.’132 Here Kissinger 
21 
 
unwittingly raises an important point sometimes neglected in postcolonial readings: the role of Oriental 
agency in using, reinforcing and manipulating Western cultural preconceptions to serve strategic 
purposes in war and peace.    
     This instance of ‘failure’ is thus considerably more complicated and certainly less absolute than 
some of the historiography has hitherto suggested. Clearly there were analytical pitfalls that drew 
heavily on Orientalist beliefs about the ‘otherness’ of the Arab mind.  However, this appears to have 
been more prevalent in assessments of Egypt’s capabilities than her intentions. To dismiss the political 
and intelligence community as having ‘failed’ to understand Sadat’s intentions, as the historiography 
does, is to misrepresent the role of these perceptions in their historical context. That war was not 
anticipated in
 
October 1973 was not the result of an inability to understand the motivations of a leader 
in crisis, for which intelligence is often criticised, but rather a rarer failure to recognise an altered 
capability.  
     Nor was this an exclusively Western misconception. As Heikal and numerous others have indicated, 
no one was more surprised by Egypt’s military achievements early in the conflict than Sadat himself.133 
To this day, it is impossible to know whether the ‘signals’ and ‘noise’ problem that analysts faced with 
Sadat’s vehement professions in the 1971-1973 period was the intentional result of a long-term 
deception campaign, sheer indecision or something in between. Is it therefore plausible and historically 
accurate to lament the inability of Western intelligence services to reveal an outcome that Sadat was 
himself unsure about and call it a ‘failure’ of intelligence? 
     Most importantly, this discussion has shown that the ‘cultural lens’ can serve both as an aid and an 
impediment to analysis. How this double-edged sword cuts through an understanding of allies and 
adversaries depends on how much empathy and critical self-awareness accompanies it, as well as how 
the object uses and manipulates the subject’s cultural preconceptions. A closer look at this seminal 
historical juncture makes it clear that the narrative Kissinger has popularised of a ‘cultural divide’ fails 
to capture the contradictory impulses of understanding and misunderstanding that informed much 
diplomatic and intelligence analysis of the Middle East in the years preceding the Yom Kippur war. 
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